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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through its Road Commission, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
BRIANT S. JACOBS and 
BARBARA T. JACOBS, his wife; 
DARRELL G. HAFEN and 
RAQUEL E HAFEN, his wife; 
B.Y.U. EMPLOYEE FEDERAL 
CREDIT UNION; and ROAD 
RUNNER INN, INC., a 
corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
9949 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in Eminent Domain to con-
demn 33.33 acres of real property and 0.14 acres 
for an irrigation easement, used in the construction 
of the interstate highway through Washington Coun-
ty near the city of Washington, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which brought in a 
verdict in favor of the property owners of $16,000.00 
from which verdict and judgment defendants appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Note: There appears to be at least 3 volumes 
of record each containing pages beginning with 1 
etc. We have therefore taken the liberty to designate 
the volumes A, B, and C, and will refer to pages in 
the designated volumn. Where we refer to the record 
Tr. it will refer to Volumn I and II of transcript of 
testimony, also designated G. Volumn A comprises 
the pleadings, etc. as shown by the index. We have 
not designated the transcript on the pre-trial.) 
The property so condemned was a part of a 40-
acre tract conveyed by warranty deed by the former 
owners, Israel Neilson and Caddie Neilson, to Briant 
S. Jacobs and Barbara T. Jacobs, his wife (R. 15B). 
The 40-acre tract was a part of a tract comprising 
185.09 acres optioned at a price of $100,000, by said 
Neilsons to Darrell G. Hafen and his wife who as-
signed their interest (R 44-45B) (R 124C), after 
having exercised the option to purchase the property 
( R 6B), to said Jacobs, who held title to the whole 
of said property in trust for Road Runner Inn, Inc. 
( R 84B), which company acquired the properties for 
the purpose of constructing and developing a golf 
course, and other construction which would improve 
economically the surrounding area of Washington, 
Utah, (Ex. D-1) (R 15B). 
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The option by which the Road Runner Inn group 
acquired the interest in the 185.09 acres was dated 
June 30th, 1960. There was an amendment thereto 
in writing bearing date September lOth 1960, (Ex. 
D-2) giving and granting to Hafen, the optionee, the 
right, upon payment of $30,000 cash and $10,000 in 
stock of Road Runner Inn Corporation to select 40 
acres of the property in one piece. To raise the 
$30,000 cash with which to pay off Mr. Neilsen, Mr. 
Jacobs mortgaged the 40-acre tract to BYU Em-
ployees Credit Union which mortgagee advanced 
$33,000 and took the mortgage on that 40-acre tract 
of which the state took 33.03 acres for the Highway, 
(R 58-59B) which money was to be paid back to the 
Credit Union from that realized out of this acreage 
( R 60B). This acreage was the best property in the 
whole piece (R 62B) (R 65B). The mortgage to the 
Credit Union covered the 33.03 acres taken by the 
state and an additional tract of 6.37 acres. At the 
time of the entering into the option by Hafen on 
June 30, 1960 and the amendment of September 
10, 1960 Hafen did not know where the right-of-way 
was to be located precisely (R 67B). 
Defendants' witness Werner Kiepe placed a 
,·alue on that property taken by the state at the time 
of taking of $67,000 or approximately $2,000 an 
acre. The State's witness Edmond D. Cook placed a 
value on the property at $400 per acre or a total of 
$13,332 on the tract taken and $56 on that property 
taken for the easement. State's witness, Cl. Francis 
Solomon, testified to a value of $16,000 total, basing 
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his value on the highest and best use of the property 
as agriculture and grazing (R 376C). 
A portion of the property taken for highway 
purposes, as is shown on the map attached to plain-
tiff's complaint, is situated within the town or city 
of Washington, Utah which had no zoning ordinance. 
That property taken by the state without said city is 
zoned agriculture and grazing, the grazing zoning 
permits the construction of golf courses. The trial 
court in its instructions to the jury instructed that 
the property was on the 20th day of September, 1962 
zoned by Washington County for grazing and agri-
cultural usage and the trial court further instructed 
the jury that the usage of the property for residen-
tial subdivision and commercial enterprises or either 
of them was prohibited by the County Ordinance. 
The court refused to permit defendant-appel-
lant, Road Runner Inn to show the amount it had 
contracted to pay for the property. The trial court 
also refused to permit counsel for appellants to refer 
to that testimony of state's witness C. Francis Solo-
mon pertaining to the "unusual circumstances" of 
Jacobs mortgaging the 40-acre tract to which he re-
ceived a deed from Neilson to BYU Employees Fed-
eral Credit Union, to the jury. (R 403C) The Court 
also refused to permit appellants to introduce the 
articles of incorporation of Road Runner Inn, Inc. 
which would show the purpose for which that corpo-
ration was organized. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WHEN 
IT APPEARED THAT AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPED DURING THE 
TRIAL OF THE CASE BETWEEN ONE· OF THE 
JURORS AND ONE OF COUNSEL FOR PLAIN-
TIFF. 
Charles M. Pickett, Esq. who was not associated 
as counsel for the state until the commencement of 
the trial has, since his admission to the bar, lived in 
the city of St. George and has practiced law in the 
county of Washington, Utah, ever since his admis-
sion, which covers a period of many years. Mr. Pick-
ett is and has been prominent in civic and political 
affairs in the county of Washington, and has held 
the office of County Attorney, and at the time of the 
trial of this case held the office of District Attorney. 
Appellants had moved, prior to the association of Mr. 
Pickett as counsel for the state, for a change of place 
of trial, which motion was denied. Upon Mr. Picket 
becoming associated as counsel for plaintiff, each of 
the appellants again renewed their motions for 
change of place of trial, which motions were again 
denied. 
\Yhile the attorney-client relationship did not 
exist between Mr. Pickett and juror, Clifton Wilson, 
at the commencement of the trial, it developed dur-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
ing the trial. The association of Mr. Pickett with the 
case being tried at St. George, Washington County, 
Utah, was highly prejudicial to appellants and their 
motion for new trial should have been granted. It 
was admitted by Mr. Pickett that during the trial 
of the case, Juror Wilson did consult with Mr. Pick-
ett on a legal matter the nature of which most cer-
tainly constituted an attorney-client relationship. 
Point II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT THE AMOUNT WHICH WAS 
PAID FOR THE PROPERTY IS IMMATERIAL. 
During the direct examination of witness Hafen 
he testified as follows: 
Q. Mr. Hafen, at the present time well, with-
-draw that. Now, pursuant to payments that 
have been made, has Israel Neilson actually 
deeded all or part of the property-
A. He deeded part of the property, 40 acres. 
Q. Part of it is deeded from him at the pres-
ent time? 
A. Yes, we paid him $40,000.00. 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
Now, wait a minute. Your Honor. I realize 
that the objection- he isn't being responsive 
and I think this witness is volunteering infor-
mation and attempting to put it before this 
Court by· way of his own speech things that 
counsel is not asking; and I ask the Court to 
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instruct the witness to only answer those ques-
tions which are submitted to him by his attor-
ney. 
THE COURT: 
All right, Mr. Hafen you heard Mr. Camp-
bell's statement; and I will put it to you this 
way: Just answer counsel's questions and not 
volunteer information. I have already sus-
tained the objection to the amount of money 
that was paid in this matter. Now I instruct 
you gentlemen to put out of your minds, en-
tirely disregard Mr. Hafen's last statement 
which was volunteered. The fact that he paid 
$1 or $40,000 or any amount in between is im-
material in this case. What he's paid on this 
is entirely immaterial. If he paid $10, we cer-
tainly wouldn't put that as a valuation of this 
property. If he paid $90,000, we wouldn't put 
that as a valuation, so the amount he has paid 
is immaterial. You are instructed to disregard 
it, and you, Mr. Hafen, don't volunteer, just 
answer counsel's questions. (Tr. 121) 
Counsel did not move to strike the answer given 
by the witness. 
While counsel for defendants stated that none 
of the questions relative to partial payment were de-
signed to establish any price. Still the fact that the 
court instructed the jury as it did was highly preju-
dicial and the instruction was against the law. 
In 7 ALR 2d 77 4 the law is stated as follows: 
Evidence of the price paid by the owner of 
property sought to be condemned is admissible 
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as bearing on its market value, unless the sale 
was too remote in point of time from the con-
demnation proceedings to afford a fair cri-
terion of present value. 
It was apparent that the acquisition of the prop-
erty was not too remote in time . 
The Utah Courts followed the law as announced 
in 7 ALR 2d 774 in Weber Basin v. Ward, 10 U2d 
29, 34 7 P2d 862. 
Point III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSING TO 
PERMIT APPELLANTS TO SHOW THE PLANS 
WHICH HAD BEEN MADE FOR THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN BY 
PLAINTIFF. 
Appellants had staked out a golf course taking 
in that property condemned, they had also procured 
architects plans for other development including 
some residences. One of the exhibits attached to 
plaintiff's complaint shows a part of the property 
taken as being within a dedicated subdivision and 
still the trial court refused to permit appellants to 
testify to their plans, but confined appellants' wit-
nesses testimony to only a part of that development 
actually made on the land itself. A part of the testi-
mony of witness Hafen and the rulings made by the 
court are as follows : 
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Q. And for what purposes were expenditures 
of funds made by the Roadrunner Inn toward 
development of that area prior to this date. 
September 20, 1962? 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
If the Court please, I am going to object to 
that on the ground and for the reason there's 
no foundation laid to show that whatever in-
tended use was made, was going to be made of 
this property, or had any connection or asso-
ciation with the property that the State seeks 
to acquire in the case. Until that foundation is 
laid and properly laid, this testimony would 
be completely immaterial and irrelevant in de-
termining what the willing buyer would pay 
for property and the willing seller would dis-
pose of the property for as of that date. 
THE COURT: 
Well, the objection is approved, Mr. Fuller. 
It occurs to me if some steps were made to 
develop the property and something was done 
on the property, I want to hear about that; 
but if they went over some place and took some 
steps not concerned with that-
MR. FULLER: 
Our line of questionig goes to the steps per-
taining to the property itself. 
THE COURT: 
~ know, pertaining to the property; but was 
It on the property? 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Hafen, let me ask you some questions. Did 
you make any improvements to the 185 acres 
prior to September 20, 1962? 
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THE WITNESS: 
Well, we dug some foundation holes for the 
buildings and staked out a golf course and 
whether or not it includes our architectural 
plans or things of that -
THE COURT: 
Architectural pans are not work on the 
ground, are they? I'm asking you what work 
was done on the real estate itself? 
The record shows further questions propounded 
by the court with the folowing result: 
THE COURT: 
All right. With regard to your question Mr. 
Fuller, I must sustain the objection to it other 
than as he's now answered. He's told us the 
steps that he has taken to develop the 185 
acres on the land. 
MR. FULLER: 
You are referring to the physical activities on 
the ground? 
THE COURT: 
Physical activities. 
MR. FULLER: 
You are limiting it to that? 
THE COURT: 
Right. (Tr. 149-153) 
In Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, at page 
157 it is said: 
Evidence of the value of property for any use 
to which it is reasonably adapted is admis-
sible, but such evidence must be limited to a 
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bare statement why the property is so adapted 
for a particular purpose and. to testimony .of 
its value for such purpose, Its uses and Its 
particular fitness for such uses. 
Generally a witness may give his opinion of 
the value of such property based on such uses 
and the value thereof, when it has been shown 
that he has some knowledge of such uses be-
yond that of the jurors. Thus evidence of the 
market value of the property for the best and 
most profitable use to which it may be devoted 
in the reasonably near future is admissible. 
As bearing upon these issues the owner may 
offer a plan showing a possible scheme of de-
velopment for the purpose for which it is most 
available provided it appears that the likeli-
hood of demand for the property for that pur-
pose is such as to affect market value. 
If the adaptability for such potential use is 
such as to have a positive influence upon pres-
ent market value it has been held competent 
for a witness to express an opinion as to the 
adaptability of the property for such pur-
poses. A map or plan which graphicaly illus-
tl·ates the potential use is equaly admissible. 
The Utah Court stated in Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. S. L. County, 250 P2d 938 at 940 as follows: 
The adaptability of the land sought to be taken 
in eminent domain for a special purpose or 
use may be considered as an element of value. 
If the land possesses a special value to the 
owner which can be measured in money, he 
has the right to have that value considered 
in the estimate of compensation and damages. 
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From the necessity of the case the value must 
be arrived at from the opinions of well-in-
formed persons based upon the purposes for 
which the property is sui table. This is not tak-
ing the "value in use" to the owner as contra-
distinguished from the market value. What is 
done is merely to take into consideration the 
purposes for which the property is suitable 
as a means of ascertaining what reasonable 
purchasers would in all probability be willing 
to give for it, which in a general sense may 
be said to be the market value. In order that 
this rule be applicable, it must appear, not 
that the property is peculiar, but that the rela-
tionship of the owner thereto is peculiar, its 
advantages to him more or less exclusive -
that is, that it is property having value pecul-
iar to the owner only, and without possible 
like value to others who may acquire it. 
And again in the case of Salt Lake County Cot-
tonwood Sanitary District v. Toone, (1960), 11 U2d 
232, 357 P2d 486, this Court in speaking through 
Mr. Justice Crockett said at page 488: 
We have no disposition to disagree with the 
defendants' argument that evidence of plans 
for a particular use of property may be mate-
rial and relevant where it is offered as having 
some bearing upon its value under the rule 
stated above. But the defendants did not pro-
pose to proceed upon that premise. 
In the instant case appellants did propose to 
show the plans which had been made for the particu-
lar development of the property and the court was 
so advised not only once but on several occasions. 
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Point IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING 
DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE TO ONLY THOSE 
USES PERMITTED UNDER EXISTING ZON-
ING LAWS IN WASHINGTON COUNTY. 
It is recognized procedure and law in a condem-
nation case that a property owner is entitled to re-
Cl1ive a price for his property according to its fair 
market value for its highest and best use to which 
it was adaptable on the date of taking. In fact, with-
out first establishing what the highest and best use 
of the property was at that time, it is, of course, a 
very difficult matter to even attempt to place a price 
upon the land. Defendants submit that in this case 
they were absolutely prohibited at every point in the 
case from developing evidence before the jury as 
to the highest and best use of the property. 
Before the trial commenced Counsel for Defend-
ants stated: 
... And so that the Court is clearly aware of 
our position, let me say this : That we are go-
i~g to proceed under the logical theory of the 
h1ghest and best use of the property. We will 
not depart from that theory. Furthermore 
we are not going to claim any highest and 
best use or special use that might be applicable 
me~el~ to these ~wners. In short, what we will 
claim IS that this property has certain value 
for certain uses. 
It will be our contention that this value would 
apply to any other purchaser or group of pur-
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chasers similarly situated who have knowl-
edge of the adaptability of this property for 
various uses. And our contention is in this re-
spect, Your Honor: that the property had a 
dual type of usage. Our evidence will go to 
the usage being a combination residential, 
commercial, and recreational area; and that 
that represented at the time of the taking 
the highest and best use of the property. ( TR. 
26) 
Proceeding upon that basis defendants imme-
diately met opposition from plaintiff before the trial 
commenced which, for the purpose of this portion of 
the Brief, were addressed primarily to the fact that 
the contemplated highest and best uses of the prop-
erty were not actually permitted under the zoning 
regulations of Washington County at the time of 
taking. The plaintiff's position was stated as fol-
lows: 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
... it is our position, your Honor, and we will 
ask the Court to instruct the Jury that as of 
the date of service of summons in this case, 
September 20, 1962, this property was zoned 
partially grazing, partially agricultural by 
the County Commission of Washington Coun-
ty and that the zoning ordinance is determi-
native as to the use to which this property can 
be put at that date. 
We feel that it is purely speculative and con-
jectural to receive evidence with respect to 
whether or not the County Zoning Commission 
and the County Commissioners themselves 
may at some time in the future rezone the 
property ... ( Tr. 50) 
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THE COURT: 
... I don't think that you people can present 
evidence here, and I am going to stop you, 
which will show an illegal or improper use 
of these premises under the law. I don't 
think we can speculate as to what a county 
commissioner might do if his wife persuades 
him sufficiently. 
I think that it is speculative. I will read your 
cases, but my offhand thinking is that it is 
speculative and remote, too distant to warrant 
the Jury speculating on it. (Tr. 63) 
The actual facts were that in 1958 Washington 
County, for the first time in its history, adopted a 
Zoning Resolution. The resolution is set forth as Ex-
hibit P-8, and also contains a map of the various 
areas of Washington County coming within the var-
ious zoned areas. It excluded from its operation the 
incorporated areas of the county. In fact the town of 
'\Vashington which was contiguous to the subject 
property and which had a portion of it within its 
limits (exhibit attached to complaint), did not have 
zoning regulations of any type. Furthermore, in 
drawing up the boundaries of the various zoned areas 
there was no attempt to set forth any legal descrip-
tions separating the areas. As to the property in 
question, part of it lay within an agricultural area 
and part of it lay in a grazing area, with the line 
dividing the two indicated only upon the map pre-
pared by the county officials. The Zoning Regula-
tion, being very new in the county, contained areas 
of inconsistency, as, for instance, golf courses were 
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permitted in both residential and grazing areas, but 
were omitted from permitted uses in agricultural 
areas. 
Proceeding upon the basis that a well-informed 
purchaser would consider the likelihood that zoning 
regulations would be altered or changed if the con-
templated usages of an area were such as to appear 
reasonably likely of approval by the proper officials, 
plaintiffs objected to the opening statement made 
by defendants: 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
... but let it be well known it is the position 
of the State of Utah in this case that any 
proposed testimony or any statement relative 
to any other use than the- that was recog-
nized and permitted under the zoning ordi-
nance at the time of condemnation are inad-
missible and I object to Mr. Fuller's statement. 
(Tr. 103-104) 
Mr. Darrell Hafen, the first witness called by 
defendants, was prohibited from giving evidence of 
the highest and best use of the subject property other 
than for those uses permitted urider the zoning ordi-
nances: 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Fuller, my thinking on this is that unless 
the highest and best use contemplated by the 
witness, Mr. Hafen, is within the purview of 
the County Ordinance, that is, the property 
was zoned, that his statement would be irrele-
vant and immaterial. That is the way I intend 
to rule on it. ( Tr. 131) 
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Defendants attempted to prove through Mr. 
Hafen and through other witnesses that proceedings 
were had with Washington City for a considerable 
length of time prior to the condemnation action 
whereby the subject properties would have been an-
nexed to Washington City, which had no zoning ordi-
nances or regulations of any kind. This annexation 
would have automatically worked to eliminate the 
county regulations governing use of the subject prop-
erties under the peculiar arrangement then existing 
in the St. George area. In fact, within 60 days after 
the actual condemnation the city council of Wash-
ington City actually approved the annexation. 
The following excerpts are taken from the tran-
script bearing upon the material rulings of the Court 
on all offers relating to the probability of rezoning 
which existed at the time of taking: 
THE COURT: 
Well, supposing that as a matter of fact, Mr. 
Fuller, Washington City did something the 
following day, but supposing that they didn't 
do anything for 100 years later? The fact 
of the matter is on September 20, which is the 
date we are concerned with, nothing had hap-
pened. It was not annexed to Washington 
City; and my thinking on that is it is irrele-
vant. 
MR. FULLER: 
Then you would make-
THE COURT: 
I so rule. 
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MR. FULLER: 
We have an exception to the rule. 
THE COURT: 
All right. ( Tr. 133) 
Q. (By MR. FULLER): 
Mr. Hafen, with respect to this property at 
the time it was acquired by the State, were any 
proceedings being had towards annexation of 
it to Washington City? 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
If the Court please, we object to that on the 
ground and for the reason that it is purely 
speculative and hypothetical and conjectural. 
MR. FULLER: 
I am asking him as to a fact, your Honor. (Tr. 
131-132) 
MR. FULLER: 
At this time, your Honor, with respect to the 
Court's rulings or series of rulings on two 
points that have been made during the course 
of direct examination of Mr. Darrell Hafen, 
we would like to make a proffer of proof as 
to what evidence would be elicited through 
Mr. Hafen and have it put on the record. I 
will proceed on that basis. As to the first point, 
concerning the possibility of a rezoning of the 
subject property from agricultural to resi-
dential, we would have elicited from Darrell 
Hafen and also from Mr. Tobler, who is the 
Clerk of Washington City Council, the Record-
er- Glen Tobler, the following facts: 
First, that the subject property is contiguous 
to Washington City and that Washington City 
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as such does not have zoning ordinances regu-
lating the building and usage of structures 
or other matters of any kind, typically found 
under zoning ordinances. That there had been 
for sometime discussions with the City Coun-
cil by Mr. Darrell Hafen and others on behalf 
of Roadrunner Inn relative to an annexation 
of this 185 acres plus some other grounds re-
tained by Mr. Nielson into Washington City-
MR. CAMPBELL: 
It was just a discussion, Mr. Fuller, just so we 
will know. 
MR. FULLER: 
-immediately prior to September 20, 1962 
and over a period of at least a year before 
that; that on November 26, 1962, we quote an 
excerpt-
THE COURT: 
November 26th? 
MR. FULLER: 
Yes, of 1962. I will read in evidence an excerpt 
from the Minutes of Washington City Coun-
cil as follows: "November 26, 1962, Minutes 
of Washington City Council Meeting held at 
the home of Councilman Ben J oley, Mayor 
Quenton Nisson presiding and conducting the 
meeting. Opening prayer by Councilman 
Rhaldo Turner. Those present were Mayor Q. 
Nisson, Glen Tobler, Ervin Hall and Coun-
cilmen Rhaldo Turner, Ike Robinson, Ernest 
Tanner, Ben Jolley and Hugh Gibson excused (out of town). 
"Also present were Darrell Hafen Bruce 
Stucki, Steve Kirkland. Darrell Hafen asked 
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to have the land owned by the Roadrunner Inn 
to be annexed into Washington City limits. 
Ben made the motion to accept the 240 acres 
into the city limits, and Rhaldo seconded it. 
All voted unanimously on the motion. I certify 
this is the true and correct copy of the above 
matter of the City Council meeting as above 
dated and recorded. Glen Tobler." 
Now, we would introduce this evidence both 
through Mr. Hafen and the City Recorder of 
Washington City. Now, with respect to the 
matter and in support of our rule that the 
Court permit all relevant evidence pertaining 
to a possible rezoning of the subject property, 
we would further establish the following facts 
through Mr. Hafen and through our wit-
nesses. First, that the subject property is con-
tiguous to Washington City. Secondly, that 
the zoning ordinances applicable to this prop-
erty of Washington County were adopted in 
1958 and that zoning is a very new matter in 
Washington County; that it has been spot-
zoned and certified for residential or commer-
cial area since the zoning without any ap-
preciable difficulty being encountered and 
that such a zoning for residential purposes 
was fairly recently enacted in Middleton. We 
would also establish generaly through the evi-
dence of this witness and through our wit-
nesses, that the growth pattern of Washing-
ton County and the needs of the community 
and those coming into the area are such that 
this would be a very logical residential zoning 
within the very near foreseeable future under 
all the facts and circumstances that have been 
brought out by this case and that could be 
brought out along the lines indicated. 
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We would further show that the general trend 
of the community is such that development 
of this type have been welcomed and that there 
would not reasonably be expected to be oppo-
sition to such a movement. (Tr. 162, 163, 164) 
There are a multitude of cases all standing for 
the proposition that a possibility or probability of 
re-zoning should be taken into account in fixing the 
value of condemned properties. And the Courts gen-
erally hold without exception that it is not necessary 
even to go to the point of having members of a city 
counsel state what they would probably do about 
re-zoning if no condemnation were involved (which 
defendants here actually purported to do had they 
been permitted). Pertinent excerpts from some of 
the cases, together with numerous other authorities, 
follow: 
People v. Donovan (California, 1962), 369 P. 
2d 1: 
There was evidence that the city authorities 
had considered re-zoning the area in which 
defendant's lot was located, but had rejected 
the changes, at least to show that the zoning 
authorities were contemplating changes in 
zoning restrictions. The reasonable probabil-
ity of a zoning change may be shown by a 
variety of factors, including neighborhood 
changes and general changes in land use. 
Washington v. Motor Freight Terminals, Inc. 
(Washington, 1960), 357 P 2d 861: 
There is, however, an exception to that rule 
i.e., when a particular use of the property, t~ 
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which it is adapted, is prohibited or restricted 
by law, but there is a reasonable probability 
that the prohibition or restriction will be mod-
ified or removed in the near future, the effect 
of such probability upon the value of the prop-
erty may be taken into consideration ... it is 
true that the members of the city council did 
not testify as to what they would "probably" 
do about a re-zoning, if there were no "free-
way" involved. But it is not true, as the state 
seems to believe, that such evidence is neces-
sary to prove that there is a reasonable prob-
ability that property would be re-zoned in the 
near future (absent the Improvement for 
which the property is being condemned). 
Commissioners v. Tallahassee, (Florida, 1959), 
116 s. 2d 762: 
900: 
We find no fault with the first District Court 
of Appeals in adopting the so-called Texas 
rule, viz. That even though an existing munic-
ipal zoning ordinance may prohibit the use of 
the property for stated purposes at the time 
of condemnation, nevertheless, if there is a 
. reasonable probability that the ordinance may 
be changed or an exception made in the fore-
seeable future, then the value for such use as 
may be included in the amendment or excep-
tion may be considered. 
Arizona v. McMinn (Arizona, 1960) 355 P. 2d 
Compensation awarded when land is taken by 
eminent domain is the market value of the 
land for any use to which it is adapted and 
for which it is available. If, therefore, the land 
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is not presently availabe for a particular use 
by reason of a zoning ordinance or other re-
strictions imposed by law, but if you find from 
the evidence that there was a reasonable prob-
ability of a change in the near future in the 
zoning ordinance, or other restrictions, then 
the effect of such probability of the minds of 
purchasers generally should be taken into con-
sideration in fixing the present market value 
of it. 
Park Commission of Wichita v. Fitch (Kansas, 
1959), 337 p 2d 1034 
Mr. Fitch owned a 29 acre tract near the city 
of Wichita upon which there were two lakes, 
comprising about 15 acres and a sandy beach. 
He testified that this property was ideal for 
recreational purposes and that he had applied 
to the city to have it rezoned so that it could 
be used for recreational purposes when the 
city extended its limits to include the proper-
ty. He testified that the property was worth 
$60,000.00 to $70,000.00 and then put on two 
witnesses who were conversant with the rec-
reational business and who testified to the 
value of the property solely from the point 
of view of its recreational value. Mr. Fitch was 
awarded $50,000.00 The Board of Park Com-
missioners appealed, one of the grounds being, 
that the entire testimony was speculative in 
that it assumed recreational purposes, when, 
in fact at the time of the taking it was so 
zoned that it could not be used for recreation-
al purposes. The Supreme Court ruled against 
this argument and in favor of Mr. Fitch. It 
said that the Park Commissioners had over-
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looked the fact that the land owner is entitled 
to show the value of the land for its most ad-
vantageous use. 
Other cases clearly supporting the foregoing 
proposition of very recent vintage, are as follows: 
Regnier Builders v. Linwood School District 
(Kansas, 1962), 369 P 2d 316. 
Rapid Transit Company v. U. S. (Tenth Circuit, 
1961) 295, F. 2 d 465. 
Mackie's Petition (Michigan, 1961), 108 N. W. 
2d 755. 
Brubaker v. State (New York, 1963), 236 
N.Y.S. 2d 395. 
The cases handed down on the point in recent 
years are numerous, and examination of the cases 
by counsel for defendants has not revealed a single 
jurisdiction contrary to the position that an apprais-
er or a potential purchaser should be able to place 
a value upon property according to its highest and 
best use, even though the contemplated usage is pro-
hibited by an existing zoning ordinance, if there is 
a reasonable likelihood that the restriction will be 
removed. It is submitted that the Court was clearly 
in error in its rulings prohibiting the introduction 
of evidence along the indicated lines. 
The remainder of Mr. Hafen's interrogation 
followed the same lines: 
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THE COURT: 
0. K. Let the record show I have considered 
your second matter of the plans for improve-
ment and my ruling will hold with regard to 
your proffer on the possibility of rezoning. 
It will still stand. ( Tr. 166) 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
Object to that statement and to any of this 
property or any part of this being used for 
commercial utilization. As the Court has in-
structed the witness, and the testimony here-
tofore indicated, this property was not zoned 
for that purpose; and it would be illegal as 
of the date of condemnation, September 20, 
1962. So I therefore ask the Court to strike 
that statement from the record and also the 
statement with respect to residential subdivi-
sion development, apart from property tracts 
being built in connection with farm utiliza-
tion. 
THE COURT: 
The Jury instructed to strike from their mind 
and memory Mr. Hafen's statement as out-
lined by Mr. Campbell. (Tr. 172) 
THE WITNESS (Mr. Hafen): 
... We started a market analysis that we 
have run three or four years ago that the 
Mayor was willing to supply us with water, 
even supplied us with the rate at which the 
water - that the City then had in effect in 
supplying us with water. So that's a matter 
of record in the analysis which hadn't oc-
curred to me until just now. I don't see where 
zoning is a problem, if you don't want-
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MR. CAMPBELL: 
Mr. Hafen, wait a minute. 
THE COURT: 
Just stop. Do you have your objection, Mr. 
Campbell? (Tr.178) 
Counsel for defendants next called Mr. William 
F. Bell, an eminent golf course architect, who was 
brought from Pasadena, California, for the purpose 
of testifying as to the suitability of part of the sub-
ject lands for the purpose of installing a golf course 
as part of the defendants' plans for development of 
the area. It was defendants' purpose, through Mr. 
Bell, to point out that there was a definite immediate 
need for a golf course in the St. George area, that 
this was practically the only course site available 
for such purpose, that it was ideally located, and 
that any potential purchaser of the subject property 
would consider this site to be adaptable for a golf 
course and that the time was ripe for the construc-
tion for such a facility. Once again the same objec-
tions were raised concerning the zoning regulation 
in force, even though it was developed that the graz-
ing portion of the lands would actually be permitted 
under the zoning ordinances for golf course pur-
poses, and Mr. Bell was prevented from giving any 
testimony other than introductory material of a lim-
ited nature: 
Q. (of Mr. Bell) : And did you go on that prop-
erty to make an inspection of it to determine 
whether all or any portion of it was suitable 
for golf course purposes? 
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A. (Mr. Bell): Well, I studied it as to its de-
sirability and what kind of layout could be 
prepared upon it; and that was - I did make 
a preliminary study. I studied the way as to 
a standard nine hole golf course, and it was 
standard. It was not substandard. 
Q. And what factors did you consider as to the 
feasibility of all or part of this property for 
that purpose? 
A. Well, generally-
MR. CAMPBELL: 
If the Court please, I object to that question 
on the ground it has no relationship to the sub-
ject property at the time we are talking about 
and at the time we are assessing compensa-
tion. It is completely foreign to us to which 
this property was devoted and couldn't be de-
voted at September 20, 1962; and while I'm 
sure this testimony would be interesting and 
I would like to hear it, I think in the interest 
of time it is completely irrelevant and has no 
- is not germane to the issues in the case 
whatsoever. 
THE COURT: 
You want to be heard, Mr. Fuller? 
MR. FULLER: 
Yes, we submit, your Honor, that we will tie 
the witness's answers to the date of taking 
and the conditions that existed at that time; 
and we say it is highly material to the issues 
on this case as to the issue of highest and best 
use of the property at th~ time of taking, or 
at least a substantial portion of it. 
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THE COURT: 
Would you two gentlemen come up here 
please? 
(Discussion between Court and counsel at the 
bench, not reported.) 
THE COURT: 
The record should show with regard to Mr. 
Campbell's objection, and I take it that his 
objection runs to the entire line of questions 
and not just merely the last question. I'm in-
clined to agree with him, Mr. Fuller; and 
therefore the objection is sustained. 
MR. FULLER: 
Then, your Honor, to further develop this wit-
ness along the lines I have indicated, the rul-
ing would be the same to the entire line of 
questions? 
THE COURT: 
Correct. 
MR. FULLER: 
So, upon that basis, we have no further ques-
tions of Mr. Bell. (Tr. 199, 200) 
Defendants next called Mr. Werner Kiepe, one 
of the most qualified and recognized appraisers in 
the Intermountain area, for the purpose of having 
him determine the highest and best use to which the 
subject properties were adaptable at the time of 
taking, and to thereupon place a value upon the prop-
erties according to such highest and best use. The 
same line of objections were once again raised, and 
Mr. Kiepe was cut rather short in his appraisal of 
the property: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
THE WITNESS (Mr. Kiepe): 
Well, your Honor, the property is subject to 
changes; and there is a Planning and V ar-
iance Committee that has the authority to 
change this zoning. So I should say in connec-
tion with the zoning, a buyer would recognize 
the zoning which is in existence and also rec-
ognize the fact that there is a body that has 
the power to change it; and this I took into 
consideration. 
THE COURT: 
I see. It is somewhat similar to the fact that 
we have a legislature that meets every two 
years, and sometimes they repeal and some-
times they add and sometimes they modify. 
You are saying that there is a body that has 
the power to change and modify and add to 
or subtract from the zoning. 
THE WITNESS (Mr. Kiepe): 
Your Honor, I also have the experience of 
many years in seeing what such bodies do. 
THE COURT: 
I think there is merit in Mr. Campbell's ob-
jection, Mr. Fuller. It seems to me that where 
we have a legal classification of property that 
we are concerned with the time of September 
20, 1962, the fact that it may possibly be 
changed in the future- it's true it may be 
changed, but it wasn't changed and it seems 
to me we are bound by what the situation was 
at the time of the State's taking. Mr. Kiepe 
made his appraisal after that date in Novem-
ber of 1962, 30 to 60 days later - possibly 
90 days later. It seems to me that we are bound 
by that appraiser - by that situation in 
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September of 1962 ; and therefore I'm going 
to sustain Mr. Campbell's objection. (Tr. 213, 
214) 
It is standard law, and recent cases support the 
proposition, that an appraiser should always consider 
the likelihood that a given piece of property would 
be re-zoned for reasonably probable potential uses: 
O'Neill v. State Department of Roads (Nebraska, 
1963), 118 N. W. 2d 616: 
Specifically, he (appraiser) based his opinion 
on comparable sales, that at some time it could 
be re-zoned, its reasonable probable potential 
uses, and re-zoning at the time bearing in 
mind recognition of probable imminence of re-
zoning, plus knowledge of real estate. All of 
the elements mentioned here as the foundation 
on which the opinion of the witness was given 
were proper to be considered by him in the 
giving of his testimony. In addition to a con-
sideration of the elements mentioned the wit-
ness gave testimony as to need for putting the 
area in condition for residential and indus-
trial use and considered all of these things in 
his opinion as to the value at the time of con-
demnation. It is of course true that involved 
was an entry into the realm of speculation, but 
it is one which is not condemned. 
Being restricted to the point where defendants 
were only able to develop a shell of a case based upon 
a value for possible limited housing development of 
a small-farm basis permitted under the agricultural 
zoning, the restriction against developing evidence of 
a probable re-zoning continued when counsel for de-
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fendants attempted to cross-examine the witnesses 
for plaintiff. Illustrations concerning this impos-
sible situation occurred upon the cross examination 
of plaintiff's witness, Mr. Solomon: 
Q. I see. Mr. Solomon, you stated in your qual-
ifications that you have actually been a sub-
divider yourself. 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. And was some of this land zoned agricul-
tural when you purchased it with ultimate 
subdivision ideas in mind? 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
Now, if the Court please, we will object to that 
on the ground and for the reason that it is 
an attempt to do what counsel has been pro-
hibited from doing during this entire trial; 
and that is to provide - require a witness 
to testify as to the illegal and prohibited use, 
and we object to the question and form of it. 
THE COURT: 
The objection is sustained, Mr. Fuller. (Tr. 
394) 
And the same ruling was received when defend-
ants' counsel cross-examined Mr. Iverson: 
Q. I see. Do you have occasional requests for 
rezoning in the county? 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
If the Court please, we'll object to that on the 
ground that it is irrelevant and calls for an 
answer that would lead us into speculative 
and conjectural areas. 
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THE COURT: 
I'm sure the answer to the question is yes, 
Mr. Fuller, that they do have occasional re-
quests for rezoning; but I can't see that it is 
rna terial in this case. 
MR. FULLER: 
We would explore the subject, with the Court's 
permission; and I take it the ruling would be 
adverse to that. 
THE COURT: 
The Court isn't going to grant you permission. 
(Tr. 430) 
As a final and complete blow to defendants' case 
the Court appeared to be considerably influenced by 
a statement made by attorney Campbell to the effect 
that Judge Thornley Swan had made a similar rul-
ing concerning zoning in a Davis County case which 
was then on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and 
which had been initially tried by attorney Campbell. 
(Tr. 52) Mr. Campbell stated there that Judge Swan 
rejected a proffer of proof as a matter of law upon 
the basis that " ... the highest and best use of the 
property must be determined as it was situated at 
the date of condemnation; ... " 
Based upon Mr. Campbell's statement concern-
ing the Davis County case, Judge Day stated: 
... and I am inclined to agree with Mr. Camp-
bell's statement with regard to Judge Swan. 
(Tr. 63) 
Being unable to believe that Judge Swan had 
made as sweeping a rule as was presented to the 
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Court at the trial, counsel for defendants immediate-
ly following the trial went to the office of the Su-
preme Court and secured the trial brief of the State 
of Utah in the Davis County matter involving Judge 
Swan. As suspected, Judge Swan ruled on a related 
matter where there was a non-conforming usage 
which had been abandoned, and subsequent attempts 
to re-zone which were rejected. The significant por-
tion of the brief contained an absolute admission on 
the part of the State of Utah that a probability of 
re-zoning clearly states the law. We quote from the 
State's brief in the matter: 
However, where the enactment of the zoning 
restrictions is not predicated upon the inher-
ent evil of the proscribed use - in other 
words, where the forbidden use is malum pro-
hibitum rather than malum in se- and there 
is a possibility or probability that the zoning 
restriction may in the near future be repealed 
or amended so as to permit the use in ques-
tion, such likelihood may be considered if the 
prospect of such repeal or amendment is suf-
ficiently likely as to have appreciable influence 
upon present market value though such pos-
sible change in the zoning regulations must 
not be speculative. ( 4 Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, 12.322.) 
See State of Utah, by and Through its Road 
Commission v. Holt (Case No. 9763). 
When the same case was decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court (381 P 2d 724- May 27, 1963) it 
became clear that the issue was different from that 
involved in this case in that the Davis County case 
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involved discontinuance of non-conforming uses and 
because in that case the property owner did not give 
" ... proof or proffer of proof that there was a prob-
ability of a zoning change or variance in the near 
future to commercial." 
In view of what appears tc be a complete mis-
representation of the Davis County case, whether 
the misrepresentation was intentional or not, it un-
doubtedly served to cause the Court to so restrict the 
defendants' case as to make it impossible to present 
evidence supporting a higher and better usage for 
the subject property other than for agricultural and 
grazing uses. 
At the conclusion of the trial the Court in-
structed the Jury as follows : 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
You are instructed that the subject property 
to be acquired by the State of Utah herein 
was, on the 20th day of September, 1962, 
zoned by Washington County for grazing and 
agricultural usage. 
In that connection, you are further instructed 
that the usage of the subject property for resi-
dential subdivision and commercial enter-
prises, or either of them, was prohibited by 
County Ordinance. ( R. 95) 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the rulings and the instruction giv-
en it is not surprising that the jury returned aver-
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diet of $16,000.00, which represented the highest 
appraisal placed upon the property for solely agri-
cultural and grazing uses as was testified to by the 
appraiser for the plaintiff who placed the highest 
value on the property for such uses. It is submitted 
that the Court was clearly in error and that the 
interests of justice can only be served by granting 
a new trial which will at least permit defendants 
to place in evidence their theory of the highest and 
best use to which the property was adaptable at the 
time of the taking, and where the existing zoning 
regulation will be given such weight concerning other 
than proscribed uses as it is entitled to receive. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. BACKMAN of Backman, 
Backman & Clark, 
Glen E. Fuller, 
Richard M. Taylor, 
Attorneys for appellants 
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